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Introduction 
 
In the last two decades politicians have in general believed that the U.S. Government has grown too 
bureaucratic and inefficient. They feel that a smaller government with fewer employees would better 
serve the public. One approach towards achieving this is to outsource some of the functions currently 
performed by government employees. From a political perspective, the outsourcing of public services 
may be claimed as an effort to achieve some or all of the following: save tax dollars, balance the Federal 
budget, fight bureaucracy, draw down public debt, support small business, and improve service quality. 
Also in the last few decades, businesses across the United States began contracting out some of their 
services, particularly Information Technology (IT) related service operations, in an effort to cut costs and 
refocus on their core functions. Given the industry trends and the perceived political benefits, politicians 
began applying pressure to Federal organizations to outsource also. This pressure continues today. 
Recently in the United States, the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act requires a new look at 
every government function in every agency for the purpose of identifying additional functions for 
outsourcing.  
The outsourcing of services in the public sector in other developed countries is even more prevalent 
than in the United States. Many European and Asian countries along with Australia and New Zealand 
face similar outsourcing challenges. For example in the European Union, Community Public Procurement 
Directives opened public contracts to competition and launched SIMAP, a public procurement 
information system aimed at making optimum use of new information technology for public 
procurements (Europa, 2001). 
In addition to political pressure, public organizations are also outsourcing additional functions 
because of shortages of skilled human resources. For example, the NASA Glenn Research Center 
(NASA Glenn) in Ohio has shrunk in size from roughly 5000 to 3000 employees in the last decade or so. 
While the workforce has decreased 40 percent, the workload has not. As a result, additional outside 
support is necessary to accomplish their mission. This situation is common in other governmental 
organizations also. For Federal organizations, outsourcing motives are not directly linked to cost-cutting 
objectives, partially because the Federal Government is funded on voted budgets. Like NASA, other 
governmental organizations also may not consider cost savings as a primary motive but rather one factor 
among many that may influence the functions to be outsourced. Other such factors include political 
pressures, availability of skilled resources, and technology. 
Existing outsourcing models do not capture the differences between public organizations and private 
industries outsourcing decision needs adequately since they usually have minimizing cost as the objective 
function. This study offers a decision support model for decision makers (DM) in public organizations, 
which takes into consideration the outsourcing motivates that are unique to them. The first step is to 
develop a list of factors and their priorities. The factors are then incorporated in the decision model to 
guide the organization in making more structured decisions about outsourcing. Once the functions to be 
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outsourced have been determined, the number of contracts needs to be determined. The outsourcing 
decision model then also addresses the disposition of displaced employees, which are retained, at least in 
the short term, in many public organizations. This is accomplished by matching the displaced employee’s 
skills with vacancies elsewhere in the organization. 
In the following section, we provide a review of the literature regarding outsourcing practices in 
public organizations. Then we present the outsourcing decision flow and review the existing decision 
support models. This is followed by the development of a decision support model and three mathematical 
formulations. In later sections, the validity of the model is tested, using data from NASA Glenn, and the 
results of the sensitivity analysis are also reported. The managerial implications and the conclusions are 
presented in the last section. 
 
Outsourcing Strategies at Public Organizations 
 
When summarizing public sector outsourcing literature we find that the drivers for outsourcing are 
perhaps less clear than for private firms. Some suggest legislative actions and political pressures are 
primary drivers (Kakabadse et al., 2000a and 2000b) while others suggest the drivers are in fact similar to 
those of private industry (Domberger et al., 1999). The lack of internal skills, the access to external skills 
as well as budget issues are reported to drive some military outsourcing activities. The military, like some 
other government organizations, is also concerned with security issues (Richardson, 1997). The need to 
refocus on core mission or strategy is also mentioned by several authors as an important driver 
(Willcocks et al., 1997; Mehling, 1998; Champy, 1996; Gordon et al., 1997; OECD, 1997; and Avery, 
2000). 
Numerous recommendations are given in the literature regarding considerations for making 
outsourcing decisions. The importance of adequately planning, communicating, and executing the human 
resource phases of the outsourcing initiative is stressed by several authors (Roberts, 2001; 
Pinnington, 1995; Kakabadse et al., 2000b; Willcocks et al., 1997; and Lafferty et al., 2000). Legal issues 
such as procurement regulations and contractual arrangements have also been identified as critical and 
can be potential areas of weakness (Champy, 1996; Gordon et al., 1997; OECD, 1997; 
GAO, 1997; and Graham, 1996). Contract oversight and monitoring skills are recognized by the U.S. 
Government as one of its particular weaknesses (GAO, 1997). Lonsdale (1999) identified the lack of 
methodology as a weakness in many outsourcing initiatives. Some authors (Antonucci et al., 1998; Avery, 
2000; Gordon et al., 1997; and Willcocks et al., 1995) imply that characteristics of functions may impact 
the decision for outsourcing. Some of these characteristics may include how integrated a function is, how 
structured it is, and how many employees it impacts. Public organizations should weigh every 
outsourcing decision to ensure that it helps to better serve the entire public in the long run and not favor 
any particular individual or industry in the process. 
In addition to the literature mentioned above, an Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) summary of outsourcing case studies reveals that governments outsource a wide 
range of functions, from IT functions to internal auditing to learning services and airport operations 
(OECD, 1997). Experiences with outsourcing in government have generally been positive, with service 
improvements occurring. Cost savings; however, are only about half of what the private sector achieves. 
A similar study (GAO, 1997) reports that one of the difficulties encountered with outsourcing, 
particularly in the United States, is the lack of skills within the public organization to manage and monitor 
outsourced functions. Other risks identified for outsourcing in the public sector include quality shedding 
(where the supplier finds ways to improve his profits by reducing quality), negative effects on 
employment, asset ownership issues, and accountability to the public. While managers in public 
organizations generally realize an accountability improvement in the particular function outsourced, they 
believe that there is a simultaneous decline in accountability to the public. The supplier works for the 
government and performs the functions to satisfy the government representative whereas a government 
employee works for the public and keeps their interests primary. 
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Another issue commonly discussed in the literature is whether outsourcing creates jobs. While some 
jobs may be created in the private sector, which would be advantageous during election campaigning, 
these same jobs are eventually lost in the public sector. Given the assumption that outsourcing is expected 
to improve productivity, the supplier should logically require fewer employees to perform the same 
functions and therefore the net result is a loss of jobs. In the United States, the elimination of civil servant 
jobs is said to be “one of the most contentious issues in public-sector outsourcing” (Gordon et al., 1997). 
In summary, outsourcing literature identifies the following 13 dominant factors that influence 
outsourcing practices in public organizations: (1) how core a function is, (2) critical knowledge 
generation, (3) relative cost, (4) the degree of a function’s integration, (5) the degree of a function’s 
structure, (6) employee impact, (7) availability of external skills, (8) availability of internal skills, (9) 
manager preferences, (10) legal issues, (11) competitor actions, (12) potential for conflict of interest, and 
(13) internal and external political pressures. In a recent study (Kremic et al., 2003) has identified six 
additional dominant factors (a total of 19) affecting outsourcing decisions. The study is based on 
interviews with decision makers (DMs) in public organizations in the United States and indicates how the 
19 dominant factors can be used to come up with an outsourceability index for each function under 
consideration. To briefly summarize, the indices are based on input from cognizant managers in the 
organization who rated the importance of each dominant factor and its applicability to the functions 
performed in the organization. The dominant factors are reiterated in table I along with the importance 
ranking of each factor as rated by NASA DMs using a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates the most 
relevant factor to NASA Glenn at the time. The scale is arbitrary and a DM can choose another scale as 
desired. Once the relative importance of factors is determined, the DM evaluates the eligible functions for 
outsourcing against each of the dominant factors. This input is then utilized to determine the 
outsourceability index for each function. In the next section we introduce a decision support model, which 
will integrate these outsourceability indices into decision-making process. 
 
Outsourcing Decision Flow 
 
Figure 1 is a flow chart describing the outsourcing decision process. Every outsourcing decision 
begins with either a formal or a casual consideration of whether or not to outsource. Based on the DM’s 
experiences, perceptions, and the current environment, the question of outsourcing will be further 
entertained or dismissed. If outsourcing is to be considered, the organization must perform some 
evaluation process to determine which of its functions, if any, are candidates for outsourcing. 
Some of the factors to consider when making this determination are the relative costs of performing 
the function, how core is the function to the organization, the long-term strategy, and environmental 
factors such as sociopolitical perceptions. 
Once the functions have been evaluated, decisions can be made about which ones to actually 
outsource. If any functions are to be outsourced, two additional decisions are required. One decision is 
how to obtain the service and the other is what to do with the displaced employees. 
Services are acquired through contracts. In some cases existing contracts, which are already in place, 
can be modified to include the newly outsourced functions. In many cases however, new contracts need to 
be generated. In those cases, the functions must be grouped into contracts in a manner that minimizes 
costs and risks, yet maximizes the potential benefit from economies of scale and function synergies. The 
degree of reliance on a supplier is also important to consider. 
The next decision is to determine what to do with the employees that are displaced when a function is 
outsourced. In public organizations, employees are often reassigned to other functions. This is unlike 
many private organizations where there is a greater tendency to eliminate the displaced employees by 
transferring them to the service provider or by laying them off. In this model it is assumed that all 
employees are reassigned back into the organization although this is not a requirement for the model. 
Reassignments are made, based on an employee’s skills and experience, on his or her rank in the 
organization, and on positions available to be filled. With each new outsourcing contract, there may be 
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positions created to monitor contractor performance. This can be another opportunity for employee 
reassignment. 
Yet another reassignment opportunity is created if there is a need to capture supplier skills or 
knowledge of a critical function. The organization may want to maintain their knowledge or skills in a 
function even though it is outsourced. In such cases they may want to dedicate staff to work with the 
supplier in order to capture that knowledge and maintain a skill. 
All these issues need to be considered when deciding what and how to outsource and it is a 
challenging endeavor for a DM, especially when there is a lack of methodology to follow (Lonsdale, 
1999). In order to help systematize the DM’s decision process as well as to guide him/her in 
understanding the implications of the decision on the workforce and contract, we present a decision 
support model for outsourcing initiatives. This model is explained in detail in the next section. 
 
A Decision Support Model for Public Organizations 
 
There has been several decision support models developed in the literature for assisting organizations 
in outsourcing practices in private sector. For example, Lonsdale (1999) discusses a risk minimizing 
approach to outsourcing. His model recommends understanding and protecting the sources of the 
organization’s competitive advantage and realizing the potential for dependency. Jennings 
(2002) assumes that outsourcing is undertaken to achieve competitive advantage. He develops a 
conceptual model that considers the organization’s capability and its competitive environment. Cost, 
supply environment, and technology are factors that influence capability. Rao and Young 
(1994) develop a model for outsourcing in the logistics field. They identify several factor sets to be 
considered in such an environment. The centrality/criticality of the function, cost, technology and 
complexity, risk, and market relationships comprise the factors. Arnold (2000) develops an “integrated 
model” using both transaction cost economics and a core competence approach. Arnold suggests that 
managers should answer the following three questions to determine if a function should be outsourced; 
these are (1) “Is the activity highly specific?” (2) “Is the activity strategically important?” and (3) “Is the 
activity a core competence…?” Although the model is rather broad, it does provide guidance to determine 
what factors affect a decision and in which way. Dekkers (2000) develops a conceptual outsourcing 
model for manufacturing industries. His objective is to develop a tool for outsourcing decisions. A 
process mapping approach is used to link manufacturing functions with outsourcing decisions. Finally, 
Yang and Huang (2000) used Saaty’s (1980) analytical hierarchy process (AHP) to support IT 
outsourcing decisions. 
The existing models in literature provide differing perspectives of how outsourcing decisions and 
factors relate to each other and to the organization. They reinforce the importance of certain factors to 
consider. Moreover, they provide some guidance and increased detail of the outsourcing problem. 
However little information is given on the success of these models or how managers used them. 
Furthermore, the models lack many of the factors that are important to public organizations. First, to the 
authors’ knowledge, none of the models in the literature specifically address the political factors faced by 
public organizations. Many existing models also lack the ability to determine what factor(s) is of greatest 
importance to the outsourcing DM. Furthermore, many existing models assume that competitive 
advantage, financial gain, or other cost and strategy objectives drive the outsourcing initiatives, which is 
not an accurate assumption for many public organizations. The drivers may be quite different in the 
public organization. Third, existing models fail to address what happens internally after it is decided to 
outsource a function considering that public organizations tend to retain the employees much more so 
than private industry. 
The model developed in this study seeks to address these limitations. The model is presented in 
figure 2. It is referred to as the Decision Support Model for Public Organizations (DSMPO). It depicts 
how a public organization’s outsourcing decision may occur. 
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Successful implementation of the DSMPO requires information on the work being performed, the 
impacted employees, cost structures, departments and facilities, and skills. These records or sources of 
information are shown in figure 2 and identified by a gray background color. The information is collected 
into electronic storage and organized for use by the Integer Programming (IP) solvers. 
There are three IP formulations in the model, labeled in the DSMPO as IP1, IP2, and IP3. IP1 
recommends which functions to outsource. As indicated by the DSMPO, the results of IP1 will be 
reviewed by the DM who may then determine that adjustments are necessary. Once the functions planned 
for outsourcing are final, they become input for the other two formulations. Prior to the partitioning of 
functions into contracts, the DM may choose to add some of the functions to existing contracts. If this is 
the case, those functions are taken out of the set to be outsourced. The remaining functions are then 
partitioned into new contracts by IP2. The DM may also choose to review the results of IP2. IP3 looks at 
the people displaced when functions are outsourced and seeks to reassign them. The output of IP3 is a list 
of reassignments and once again the DM has the option of reviewing and adjusting the output. 
Three parties play a role in applying the model and inputting the data. The primary interface to the 
model is the model user who has detailed knowledge of the model and the internal relationships. He/she 
collects data and enters the information about the organization. Organizational representatives (managers) 
provide most of the information. The third party is the DM(s) who provides input and ultimately makes 
the decisions. 
In the following subsections, the three IP formulations are discussed in more detail.  
 
IP1 Formulation 
 
IP1 assumes that the public organization will outsource as many functions as its outsourcing budget 
will allow as long as it does not threaten the loss of critical skills (its core competence). Recall that for 
public organizations, outsourcing will initially cost more money assuming that many of the employees are 
retained. 
The objective function for IP1 seeks to maximize the outsourceability value of the set of functions 
outsourced, subject to internal constraints. The model seeks to choose functions with high values of 
outsourceability index, Wij where,  
 
Wij
1
F
f
Rf Vijf∑
=         
∀ i, j 
 
Rf is the importance ranking for factor f, f = 1, …, F, and Vijf is the evaluation of function i in 
department j for each factor f. For each function i in department j, the outsourceability index is calculated 
using a weighted factor scoring method where the 19 factors are weighted by a DM according to level of 
importance and multiplied by a score (Vijf ) each function gets based on how well it relates to that factor 
(Kremic et al., 2003). It should also be noted that some distinct functions in an organization are related 
such that it only makes sense to either keep them all in-house or all outsourced together. This type of 
relationship between functions is captured by so called “associated functions” sets in the model.  
 
IP1: 
Max
1
J
j 1
I
i
Wij Xij∑
=
∑
=  
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Subject to 
 
(1)
 1
J
j 1
I
i
Cij Xij∑
=
∑
=
B≤
 
 
 
(2)
 1
J
j 1
I
i
Sijk∑
=
∑
=
Xij
1
J
j 1
I
i
Sijk∑
=
∑
=
<
 
∀ k ∈ K,
 
 
 
(3) xij = xnl ∀ (i,j) and (n,l) ∈ Gm 
 
 
(4)
 1
J
j 1
I
i
Xij∑
=
∑
=
1≥
 
 
 
(5) Xij ∈ {0,1} ∀ i, j 
 
The decision variables of the formulation are 
 
Xij:  An integer variable that has a value of 1 if function i in department j is 
outsourced, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The parameters used in the formulations are 
 
 B: Outsourcing budget.  
Cij: Cost of performing function i in department j. 
Gm: A set of m associated functions that are to be outsourced (or kept in-house) 
as a group, where m = 1, …, M. 
 
 I: Total number of functions being considered for outsourcing. 
J: Total number of departments or facilities where the functions are performed. 
K: Set of critical skills. 
Sijk:  Has a value 1 if function i in department j employs critical skill k, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Constraint (1) ensures that the budget to pay a contractor for the newly outsourced services is not 
exceeded. The second constraint ensures that not all functions that use a critical skill are outsourced in 
order to prevent the loss of core competency. Constraint (3) keeps associated functions together (either 
outsourced or kept inhouse) while the last constraint (4) forces at least one function to be outsourced. 
Constraint (4) is added to ensure that the model will identify at least one function to outsource, as this is 
the basic premise for using the model in the first place. Recall that this model is developed for the public 
organizations with fixed budgets, retained employees, and political pressure to outsource. The underlying 
assumption is that it is desired (or perhaps required) to outsource additional functions. Note that IP1 is a 
knapsack problem with side constraints. 
Once the functions to be outsourced are determined they must be put into contracts; the purpose of the 
second formulation, IP2.  
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IP2 Formulation 
 
This formulation is based on set partitioning problems and is similar to the political districting 
problem. The objective function seeks to minimize cost by placing all functions into the minimum 
number of contracts such that no constraints are violated. Each additional contract would require an 
additional set of contract generation, procurement, and monitoring and maintenance costs. Since neither 
the number of functions being outsourced nor the estimate of implementing them through a contractor 
changes, it follows that minimizing the number of contracts is a reasonable approach in attempting to 
minimize contract-related costs. Fewer contracts also implies more functions per contract which, 
depending on function similarity, may increase synergy and further minimize cost. The primary input for 
IP2 is a list of functions to outsource. The output of IP2 is a list of contracts and the functions included in 
each. 
 
IP2: 
 
 
Min
1
Q
q
CGq Zq∑
=  
 
 
Subject to 
 
(7)
 1
M
m 
C m emq ∑ 
= 
⎛ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
⎞ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
Z q MDV≤ 
 
∀ q, q = 1, …, Q
 
 
 
(8) erq Zq = esq Zq ∀ (r,s) ∈ Gv and  
  ∀ q, v, v = 1, …, V 
 
 
(9)
 1
Uy
p
epq∑
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎞⎟⎟⎠
Zq Uy<
 ∀ p ∈ Uy, and ∀ q, y, 
  y=1, …, Y 
 
(10)
 1
Q
q
emq Zq∑
=
1
  
∀ m, m = 1, …, M
 
 
 
(11) Zq ∈ {0,1} ∀ q  
 
The decision variables for the formulation are 
 
Zq:  An integer variable that has the value of 1 if the contract q is in the partition 
plan, and 0 otherwise.  q = 1, …, Q 
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The following parameters are used 
 
Cm: Estimated cost for a contractor to perform function m. 
CGq: Total cost to generate and maintain contract q. 
emq:  Has a value 1 if function m is in contract q, and 0 otherwise. 
Gv: A set of v associated functions that are to be outsourced or (kept inhouse) as 
a group, where v = 1, …, V. 
M: Total number of functions being outsourced. 
MDV: The maximum dollar value of a single contract. 
Uy:  A set of functions where the entire set cannot be in any given contract. Y = 1, 
.., Y, and │Uy│ indicates the size of the set. 
Q: The maximum possible number of contract combinations in the plan. 
 
Q can be calculated from the total number of functions outsourced, M, by the following: 
 
(12) Q =   M!
1
M 1−
n
1
n! M n−( )!∑=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎞⎟⎟⎠
1+
 
 
Note that Q is an upper bound on the number of possible contracts to choose from and it increases 
combinatorially as the number of functions to outsource increases. 
The first constraint limits the contract size of any contract, q, to a maximum dollar value (MDV). It is 
assumed that the cost of each function is Cm regardless of which contract it is part of. The second 
constraint ensures that associated functions are to be treated as a group and are assigned to the same 
contract. In many cases, however, not every contract option is desired. For example, it might not be 
desirable to include too many or the wrong combination of functions in a contract and give it to a single 
supplier resulting in a power advantage or a conflict of interest. These preferences are imposed in the 
formulation by constraint set (9). Constraint (10) ensures that every function is included in one and only 
one contract.  
 
IP3 Formulation 
 
The third IP formulation reassigns displaced employees to other functions in the organization. Using 
employee rank, seniority, and skills, the formulation reassigns employees to vacant positions. Some new 
functions may be created as a result of outsourcing, such as functions to capture knowledge learned by the 
contractors. These are referred to as knowledge capture (KC) functions. KC functions have priority and 
therefore employees are reassigned to KC functions before they become available for assignment to other 
functions in the organization. If an employee is not qualified to be placed into any available function, 
he/she becomes “unassigned.” The disposition of unassigned employees is left for DMs to decide.  
Note that the public employee reassignment problem must handle assignments where multiple 
functions are assigned to an employee, multiple employees to one function, or both, and the assignments 
are not necessarily in whole units (the employees can be assigned to functions at fractions of their full 
effort). The minimum unit of assignment is identified as k where k is equal to one-fourth full-time 
equivalent (FTE) for convenience and practical applicability. The formulation assumes that employees are 
not assigned overtime and therefore have a maximum of 1 FTE, or 4 k to assign. 
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1
K
k
Yijk∑
=
1≤
1
J
j 1
K
k
k Yijk∑
=
∑
=
ERCi≤
1
I
i 1
K
k
k Yijk∑
=
∑
=
FRC j≤
1
I
i 1
K
k
k Yijk∑
=
∑
=
CE j
1
TSK j
l
Zil
1
K
k
Yijk∑
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎞⎟⎟⎠
∑
=
TSK j
1
K
k
Yijk∑
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎞⎟⎟⎠
IP3: 
Max
1
I
i
EPi
1
J
j
RPij
1
K
k
k Yijk∑
=
∑
=
∑
=  
 
Subject to 
 
 
(13)  ∀ i, i = 1, …, I 
 
 
 
 
(14)  ∀ j, j = 1, …, J 
 
 
 
 
(15) ERKiYijk ≥ TRKjYijk ∀ i,j,k,  
  k = 1, …, K 
 
 
 
 
(16)  ∀ i,j,  
  and l ∈ TSKj 
 
 
 
 
(17)  ∀ i,j,  
 
 
 
 
(18)  ∀ j ∈ M 
 
 
 
 
(19) Yijk ∈ {0,1}  ∀ i,j,k 
 
The decision variables for the formulation are 
 
Yijk:  An integer variable that has the value 1 if employee i is assigned to function j 
at level k, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Note that the parameters used in IP3 do not correspond with those of IP1 and IP2. For example, i 
represents a function in IP1 and IP2, while i represents an employee in IP3. The following parameters are 
used in formulation IP3:  
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CEj: Total effort to be dedicated to knowledge capture of function j. CEj is in units 
of k. 
EPi: Indicates the benefit of assigning employee i to function j at level k where 
EPi Є (0,1). 
ERCi: The maximum amount of employee i’s time that can be reassigned, in units 
of k. 
ERKi: Rank of employee i. 
FRCj: Maximum capacity available in function j for employee reassignment, in 
units of k. 
I: Total number of employees. 
J: Total number of functions available for assignment to employees.  
K: Reciprocal of the fraction of an FTE that an employee can be assigned to a 
function. 
M: Set of knowledge capture functions. 
TRKj: The rank required of an employee to be qualified to perform function j. 
RPij: Reassignment penalty, has a value of 1 if ERKi = TRKj , and .991 otherwise. 
TSKj: Set of skills required to perform function j. │TSKj│indicates the size of the 
set. 
Zil: Has a value of 1 if employee i possesses skill l. 
 
The objective function seeks to maximize the benefits of reassignment and is subject to several 
constraints. Benefits are realized by simply finding assignments for employees. However, preference (via 
a larger EPi) is given to employees of higher rank, longer experience, and for reassignments that consume 
more of their available time (the closer to a full time reassignment the greater the benefit). The first 
constraint limits how much of an employee’s time is reassigned. The reassignment cannot exceed what 
he/she has available. The second constraint ensures that the capacity of a function to absorb employee 
effort is not exceeded. The next constraint ensures an employee for reassignment to a function is qualified 
for the function. This constraint ensures that for each function an employee is reassigned to, his or her 
rank is greater or equal to the rank required to perform the function. Constraint (16) determines if an 
employee is qualified to perform a function. This constraint ensures that the employee possesses all the 
necessary skills required by a function. Constraint (17) ensures that an employee is not assigned to the 
same function more than once. The summation allows a person to be assigned to a function a total of one 
time. This constraint will also prevent a person from being over-assigned (assigned overtime) to any 
given function. The last constraint ensures that the knowledge capture functions have reassignment 
priority and that those positions are completely filled. 
The DSMPO is designed as three sequential IP’s rather than one large one. This not only allows for 
DM intervention but also brings flexibility and practicality to the decision-making process. The functions 
that are to be outsourced in IP1 limits the sizes of IP2 and IP3 formulations, both of which are 
combinatorial in nature. For example, in IP2, there are 1023 possible contract combinations to evaluate 
for 10 functions to outsource. As the number of functions increase the number of combinations to 
consider increases exponentially and becomes very difficult if not impossible to solve. Similarly, the 
number of possible functions to outsource has a direct impact to the size of IP3. Assuming for 
convenience that 14 employees can potentially be assigned to 18 functions at four levels of effort requires 
1008 possible combinations to evaluate, not to mention that each employee may have one or more skills 
which must be matched to functions requiring those skills.  
Further, deciding what to outsource is more of a strategic decision compared to deciding on the 
number of contracts and the disposition of employees, both of which are more operational. Using a single 
model could cause the strategic issues to be driven by operational matters.  
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Application of DSMPO to NASA Glenn 
 
In order to test the validity of the model, data was collected from NASA Glenn, one of the fourteen 
NASA centers. NASA Glenn is perhaps best known for its expertise in propulsion technologies such as 
turbomachinery. The Center is roughly organized into major program offices and service/performing 
organizations. The data that was collected comes from a service/performing division. The division is 
composed of 112 people organized into six departments. The main role of the division is to manage and 
maintain the center’s infrastructure and the 100-plus structures at the complex. 
The division’s tasks can be broken into 40 functions. However nine of those were determined by 
managers to be inherently governmental and not to be outsourced. This leaves thirty-one functions that 
may be outsourced. Note, however, the same functions may be performed in more than one department in 
this division. For example, the same type of inspection function can be done in both the Facilities 
Engineering department and the Construction Management department. 
The skills resident at NASA Glenn were identified in a survey conducted in the year 2000 by the in-
house human resources organization. Thirty-seven different skills are found in the division as defined in 
the survey. This same list of 37 skills is also used in determining what skills are required to perform each 
function. The division head selected 7 of the 37 skills as critical. The functions that use the critical skills 
cannot all be outsourced. 
The division receives financial resources from several sources. A significant percentage of the 
incoming funds are set aside to pay for ongoing contracts and predetermined needs. The division has very 
limited funds to re-allocate in the near term. This fact limits the amount of new outsourcing that can be 
initiated. 
 
Data Collection 
 
The data required to implement the formulations is collected from managers within the division. The 
division leader determined the relative importance of the 19 dominant factors (shown in table I) to the 
organization in the current environment. The division leader also determined that the outsourcing budget 
is $1 M based on the current level of discretionary funding. Other budget-related information is provided 
by appropriate managers.  
Managers in the organization also provided the data on employee qualifications, the functions 
performed by their organization, the functions each employee performs and how much effort they spend 
on each function, which functions are critical, and any other data needed. They also evaluated each of the 
functions performed in their respective organizations against the 19 factors. Preprepared forms were used 
to aid in data collection and all the managers were given the same forms. The collected data was then 
transferred to a spreadsheet and checked. Figure 3 shows what the data may look like. 
Employee salaries and benefits range from roughly $50,000 to over $100,000. Since some functions 
require more people than others, the cost to perform functions depends not only on wages but also on the 
number of FTE’s assigned to the function. Function costs range between $50 K and $1.3 M per year, 
however, most functions cost between $100 K and $250 K per year.  
Roughly half the functions within the division are associated with one or more other functions. In 
particular Department 4 has 7 of its 10 functions associated together. The effect of these associations is 
that IP1 will treat them as one large function when it comes to cost.  
A list of functions that can absorb displaced employees is also collected. In total; 18 functions are 
identified that can absorb employees for up to 111 k units of effort. 
In general, the data provided by the managers was complete and appears consistent. Consistency 
refers to the agreement of related data. For example, the amount of time spent performing functions 
within the departments was equal to the time available.  
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Computational Results 
 
The IP formulations were modeled using the Lingo Solver developed by Lindo Systems. Each IP 
formulation is modeled and solved separately. IP1 recommends 10 functions from various departments to 
outsource. IP2 recommends that all the functions be placed into one contract and IP3 reassigns 10 of the 
14 employees impacted to other functions.  
The 10 functions recommended for outsourcing are shown in table II. The total estimated cost to 
perform the functions is $974,300 which leaves just $25,700 slack in the budget constraint of $1 M. The 
solution is reached in less than 4 sec on a Pentium III computer. 
The DM chose not to adjust the outputs of any of the formulations so the 10 functions are fed as 
inputs into IP2. Other inputs into IP2 include the maximum dollar value of a contract, the respective costs 
to perform the functions and any disassociations the functions may have.  
While the task of placing functions, into contracts may seem simple enough, it is a difficult problem 
to solve with integer programming. The placing of elements within sets falls within the general class of 
set covering problems. The challenge with this type of problem lies in the large number of possible 
combinations of functions.  
A heuristic was developed to reduce the problem to a more manageable size. The heuristic estimates 
the number of contracts that may be required and is based on the maximum contract dollar value (MDV) 
parameter, the average cost of the functions, and the total cost to perform all functions. The estimate is 
determined as shown in the pseudocode below. The use of the heuristic assumes that the number of 
disassociations is small. If this is not the case, the number of contracts required may need to be increased.  
A lower bound for the number of contracts may also be estimated from the number of disassociations 
and the MDV. For example, if the MDV is one-fifth of the value of the functions being outsourced, then it 
is known that the lower bound, or the minimum number of contracts required, is five. The pseudocode for 
the heuristic is as follows. 
 
Pseudocode 
Step 0. Let X = MDV / AFC  
Step 1.  Determine estimates for the minimum number of contracts 
 Let EST1 = (NF / X) + 1, rounded down 
 Let EST2 = (TFV / MDV) + 1, rounded down 
Step 2. EST = Max {EST1, EST2} 
Where: MDV is the maximum contract dollar value, 
 TFV is the total cost to perform all functions being outsourced, 
 AFC is the average cost of the functions being outsourced, 
 NF is the number of functions  
–MDV, TFV, NF, and AFC are known. 
–EST1 and EST2 are estimates for the minimum number of contracts and the larger is to 
be selected. 
 
For the NASA Glenn data, IP2 determines that the optimum solution is one contract. This occurs 
because there are no disassociations for the functions that are outsourced and because the MDV is large 
enough to accommodate all the functions. The computing time was approximately 53 sec, much larger 
than what it took to solve IP1. 
Moving to IP3, the outsourcing of 10 functions displaces some portion of the time of 14 employees. 
In total this results in 45 k units of effort to be reassigned. There are 18 functions that can absorb 
displaced employees, twelve of which are functions not recommended for outsourcing and six are 
functions that are outsourced but are selected as KC functions. The 18 functions have the combined 
capacity to absorb 111 k units of effort. 
One of the challenges with this problem is the large number of combinations and constraints. Any of 
the 14 employees can potentially be assigned to any of the 18 functions at any of 4 levels of effort. 
NASA/TM—2006-213809  13
Therefore there are 14 * 18 * 4 (for a total of 1008) combinations of people, functions, and levels. Also 
consider that each employee may have 1 or more of 37 potential skills, which must be matched to 
functions requiring 1 or more of the 37 potential skills. Because of the large number of constraints, 
preprocessing is used to reduce the problem size. For example, instead of using the list of the 37 skills, a 
shorter skills list is defined based on only those skills required to perform the absorbing functions. This 
reduces the number of constraints in the model by over 15000 yet does not affect the quality of the 
solution. 
With preprocessing, IP3 is solved to optimality in less than 2 sec on a Pentium III PC. Of the 45 k 
units of effort to be reassigned, the model reassigns 29 k units. Eight of the 14 employees have all their 
available time reassigned. Two additional employees have part of their available time reassigned and four 
employees are not reassigned. Table III presents the solution. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section we examine the effect of variations in the input data on the optimum solutions to IP1, 
IP2, and IP3. Table IV captures the majority of solution changes to IP1 that were observed. All 
parameters in the formulation were systematically changed to practical limits. Further, constraints were 
also systematically eliminated and reinserted and the changes in the value of objective function were 
recorded. In total, 40 problem instances were solved. For most changes to the input of IP1 the solution 
remains as 10 functions to outsource. Although the value of the optimum solution changes by varying 
parameters and constraints, many of the same functions remain in the recommended set.  
In the table, we report 9 of the 40 problem instances that resulted in noteworthy changes in the 
original solution to IP1. In the second column we report the type of modifications made to the model 
parameters and constraints, and in the last column we report the effect of these changes on the original 
solution to IP1.  
In many cases, function 14 in department 3 and 19 in department 2 replace functions in departments 4 
or 5 in the recommended set. These changes are a result of the modifications in associated functions, 
constraint matrix, and many of the changes to skill requirements. Additionally, function 17 in department 
2 is replaced with other functions when cost coefficients are modified.  
The new solutions obtained as a result of the sensitivity analysis of IP1 are used as inputs to both IP2 
and IP3. The resulting changes to the solutions of IP2 and IP3 are then examined and summaries are 
reported in tables 5 and 6. 
Looking at table 5 we see that either there are no changes to the solution of IP2 or two contracts are 
recommended instead of one. This is always driven by the fact that the MDV is very constraining and for 
this data set is a key parameter.  
Table 6 summarizes the sensitivity analysis of IP3. It identifies several scenarios where unsolvable 
problems are created. This illustrates how tightly the model is constrained. As an example, when the 
employees performing function 25 in department 4 are replaced with the person performing function 14 in 
department 3; effect 1 in table 4, the problem becomes unsolvable due to a combination of KC and skill 
constraints. Several of the other effects also end in a similar result. While KC and skills are important 
parameters changes to employee’s available time result in the most changes to the output.  
Effect 9 results in an additional 30 k units of effort that need to be reassigned (a total of 75 k). The 
model reassigns 49 of these for a ratio of 65 percent. It turns out that “new” employees are reassigned at 
roughly the same rate as the original set. Effect 9 is also analyzed because it is used to explore the 
formulation’s performance on slightly larger problems. While computing time does not appear to be an 
issue with this model, the number of constraints may be a consideration. There are nearly 25 000 
constraints when solving effect 9 and this number will be considerable larger if the employee’s efforts are 
broken into finer levels such as 10 percent FTE instead of the 25 percent used here.  
Overall the formulations appear to function well when tested using the NASA Glenn data. The results 
of the sensitivity analysis indicate that the outsourcing budget has the most effect in IP1. For a detailed 
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discussion refer to (Kremic, 2003). For IP2, the MDV is the parameter that appears to have the most 
effect while IP3 is most sensitive to the employee’s time available to be reassigned. Another parameter 
that may also be important to estimate accurately is employee skills. IP3 may terminate in infeasible 
solutions when the parameters that affect KC functions are changed. This is primarily because the KC 
requirements are very constraining. 
 
Managerial Implications 
 
The implementation of the DSMPO has many implications to public organizations. First, it is clear 
that outsourcing decisions are not limited to deciding what to outsource although that is certainly 
important. The related questions regarding “how to bundle functions into contracts” and “how to 
reorganize the workforce after outsourcing” also need to be answered. This model helps to answer all 
three of these questions. The DM can provide strategic and tactical input to the model. This input is 
captured by the outsourceability index. The index is a reflection of the perceived importance of dominant 
factors such as political pressure, legal issues, how integrated the function is and how relevant the factors 
are to a particular function in a particular department. These attributes of the DSMPO can attract 
managers to use the model to make more systematic decisions about what functions to outsource. It is 
also known that the reassignment of workers is a complex and cross-functional problem and not easy to 
solve. The DM is offered a tool in formulation IP3. Utilizing the model with NASA Glenn data reveals 
that even though a policy may exist to retain the workers, the DM might end up having several workers 
unassigned to in-house functions due to skills mix or other employee specific issues.  
The DSMPO was presented to DM at NASA Glenn as a possible tool to use in deciding additional 
functions to outsource. However, to date, they have not made the decision to outsource new functions. 
The political and resource pressures to increase outside support have been handled by hiring more outside 
help using existing contracts rather than creating new ones.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This study provides outsourcing decision support to public organizations. Such organizations may not 
be motivated to outsource by cost or strategy issues and therefore existing models may have limited 
applicability. The DSMPO developed in this study is designed to address the outsourcing dilemma faced 
by public organizations, which are concerned with several different primary factors beyond cost. 
Overall, the DSMPO appears to be a viable model and the three formulations provide optimum 
decisions regarding what to outsource, the best way to group the outsourced functions into contracts, and 
the best way to reassign workers. The process for generating the outsourceability indices also appears to 
be a valuable tool since it brings flexibility in decision making. Furthermore, the three models provide 
optimum solutions to large problems relatively quickly, and this allows the DM to use commercial 
solvers, which makes the DSMPO a practical solution tool for outsourcing decisions in public 
organizations. 
This study constitutes an early effort to recognize the unique aspects of outsourcing issues in public 
organizations. The model is a practical tool for DMs. It may also be useful for adoption by organizations 
that have similar motives. Broadening the model to incorporate time-based factors may be a valuable 
extension. Such an extension would allow the DM to predict or track employees’ skill development. Yet 
another extension would be to include different contract types or the ability to input function 
characteristics such that the model can be more intelligent about allocating functions to make maximum 
use of economies of scale.  
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TABLE I.—DOMINANT FACTORS FOR THE PUBLIC ORGANIZATION OUTSOURCING DECISION 
Factor 
number Factor
 Description/descriptive question Relative importance 
 Strategy   
1 Core How core is the function to the department or facility? 10 
2 Critical knowledge How important is it to maintain intimate internal knowledge about the function? 10 
3 Lack of internal resources 
How available are internal resources to perform the 
function? 10 
4 Quality impact What is the likely impact of outsourcing on current quality? 10 
5 Flexibility impact What is the likely impact of outsourcing on overall flexibility? 8 
 Cost   
6 Relative cost 
The internal costs required to perform the function 
relative to the expected costs of purchasing the 
service from a supplier. 
10 
 Function Characteristics 
  
7 Complexity How complex is the function? 5 
8 Integration How integrated is the function with other processes and systems? 5 
9 Asset specificity How much value do durable goods used or generated by the function have outside of that function? 5 
10 Structure How structured is the function? 5 
11 Employees impacted How many employees are displaced if the function is outsourced? 5 
 Environment   
12 External skill availability 
How readily can the necessary skills be found 
externally? 10 
13 External politics Are there external political pressures pushing for or against outsourcing the function? 5 
14 Internal politics Are there internal political pressures pushing for or against outsourcing the function? 5 
15 Manager preferences Are there DM preferences for or against outsourcing the function? 5 
16 Legal Are there legal obstacles, contracts, or agreements impacting the function? 5 
17 Competitor’s actions Are competitors outsourcing similar functions? 5 
18 Conflict of interest How likely is it that a conflict of interest would be created by outsourcing the function?  5 
19 Degree of uncertainty How much uncertainty exists in the environment? 5 
 
 
 
TABLE II.—FUNCTIONS RECOMMENDED FOR OUTSOURCING 
(Function, Department) General function description 
(2, 5) Administration 
(12, 2) Technician/design 
(17, 2) Engineering 
(22, 1) Administration 
(22, 4) Administration 
(23, 2) Technician/design 
(25, 4) Inspection/quality assurance 
(27, 5) Inspection/quality assurance 
(28, 5) Administration 
(28, 6) Administration 
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TABLE III.—REASSIGNMENTS OF IP3 
(Employee, function, level of effort) Amount of effort not reassigned 
Employee 1—Not reassigned 2 of 2  
(2, 18, 1) 1 of 2 
(3, 7, 1) 0 of 1 
(4, 15, 4) 0 of 4 
(5, 3, 1) 0 of 1  
(6, 3, 3) 0 of 3 
Employee 7—Not reassigned 4 of 4 
Employee 8—Not reassigned 4 of 4 
(9, 7, 3) 1 of 4 
(10, 17, 4) 0 of 4 
(11, 13, 4) 0 of 4 
(12, 10, 4) 0 of 4 
Employee 13—Not reassigned 4 of 4 
(14, 8, 4) 0 of 4 
Total reassigned (k): 29 Total not reassigned (k): 16 
 
 
TABLE IV.—CHANGES TO IP1 INPUTS AND THEIR IMPACT TO IP1 SOLUTION 
IP1 Solution 
Number  Type of Modification in IP1 Impact to the ORIGINAL IP1 Solution 
1 • Changes in Sijk and Wij 
• Change in constraint matrix (3) Function (14, 3) replaced function (25, 4) 
2 • Changes in Sijk and Wij 
• Change in constraint matrix (3) Function (14, 3) replaced function (27, 5) 
3 • Changes in Sijk and Wij 
• Change in constraint matrix (3) Function (19, 2) replaced function (25, 4) 
4 • Changes in Sijk and Wij 
• Change in constraint matrix (3) Function (19, 2) replaced function (27, 5) 
5 • Changes in Sijk and Wij 
• Change in constraint matrix (3) 
Functions (14, 3) & (19, 2) replaced both 
functions (25, 4) & (27, 5) 
6 • Change in Cij Function (20, 2) replaced function (17, 2) 
7 • Change in Sijk Function (20, 2) replaced function (25, 4) 
8 • Change in Sijk Function (14, 3) is added to the recommended set 
9 • Change in constraint (1), (2), and (3) Functions (14, 3) (19, 2) (20, 2) (27, 4) are added to the recommended set 
 
TABLE V.—RESPONSES OF IP2 TO CHANGES IN IP1 INPUT 
IP1 solution  
number  Impact to the solution of IP2 
 
Observations 
 
1 No change  
2 
No change (see observation) 
If two contracts are required: 
(2, 4, 7) and (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10) 
If the new function causes the overall contract value to 
exceed the MDV then two contracts are required. 
3 No change  
4 
No change (see observation) 
If two contracts are required: 
(2, 4, 7) and (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10) 
If the new function causes the overall contract value to 
exceed the MDV then two contracts are required. 
5 No change  
6 No change  
7 No change  
8 Two contracts instead of one: (3, 4, 7, 11) and (1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10) 
The one additional function doubles the number of 
variables and computation time required to solve 
IP2 
9 Two contracts instead of one: (1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13) and (2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 14) 
The four additional functions increase the computation 
time over 10 times.  
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TABLE VI.—RESPONSES OF IP3 TO CHANGES IN IP1 INPUT 
IP1 solution  
number  Impact to the solution of IP3 Observations 
1 Infeasible 
When new functions are outsourced the 
KC requirements must also be 
reviewed to ensure consistent 
requirements 
2 
The employee displaced by outsourcing function 14, in 
department 3 is reassigned to function 13 at a level of 1. 
Rest is same. 
 
3 Infeasible  
4 
New reassignments are (4, 8, 3) (4, 15, 1) (13, 18, 1) 
(14, 15, 3) (14, 8, 1) (18, 1, 2) (19, 1, 2) (20, 1, 1) (21, 9, 1) 
(22, 1, 3). Rest is same. 
 
5 Infeasible  
6 New reassignment is (23, 1, 3). Employee 24 not reassigned. Rest is same.  
7 Infeasible  
8 No change to original set. New employee not assigned; lacked required skills. 
9 
(2, 18, 1) (3, 7, 1) (5, 11, 1) (6, 3, 3) (9, 7, 3) (10, 15, 2) 
(10, 17, 2) (11, 15, 4) (12, 13, 3) (12, 17, 1) (14, 15, 2) 
(18, 1, 2) (19, 12, 2) (20, 1, 1) (21, 9, 1) (22, 1, 3) (23, 1, 2) 
(23, 3, 1) (25, 10, 4) (27, 17, 1) (27, 7, 3) (27, 8, 1) 
(28, 8, 3) (28, 13, 1) 
 
Employee 4 now not reassigned. 
Employees 24 and 29 not reassigned. 
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Figure 1.—Outsourcing decision flow chart. 
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Figure 2.—Outsourcing decision support model for public organizations (DSMPO). 
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Department 1
Function 
Number Function Name Skills Required
Associated 
Functions
Dis-
Associated 
Functions
Knowledge 
Capture 
Function?
Capture 
Effort 
(FTE)
Min. 
Required 
Grade
Total 
Current 
Effort 
(FTE)
Estimated 
Annual 
Cost (K)
Additional 
Capacity for 
FTEs?
Inherently 
Gov?
1 LM ** ** ** ** ** ** 1 ** ** Yes
2 MS 3 None None No NA 6 1 50 No No
3  PM 2, 5, 8 5 None Yes 0.5 9 1.5 75 No No
4 RPA 7 None 6 No NA 6 2 53 No No
5 MPM 3, 5, 8 3 None No NA 8 1.5 68 No No
6 OA 4 None 4 No NA 4 1 40 Yes No
** Note: Function 1 is inherently governmental and will not be considered for outsourcing. No additonal data collected
Employee 
Number Grade
Years of 
Service
Current 
Functions 
Performed 
Level of effort 
for each 
Function (25% 
increments) 
Skills 
Possessed
1 6 17 2 100 3, 7
2 7 32 4 100 7
3 9 18 5 100 3, 5, 8
4 7 23 4 100 3, 7
5 9 43 3, 5 50, 50 2, 3, 5, 8
6 10 27 1 100 1, 5, 9, 12
7 4 23 6 100 4
8 8 20 3 100 2, 5, 8  
 
 
Figure 3.—A sample of input data. 
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support model for a typical public organization in determining what to outsource and how. A set of outsourcing decision
factors is identified that can be used as parameters in the three integer programming formulations developed. These
formulations are used as solution engines in the model. The first formulation identifies which functions are the best
candidates for outsourcing given the organization's priorities. The other formulations place the functions into
recommended contracts and re-assign displaced employees. Data from NASA Glenn Research Center in Ohio is used to
test and analyze the model. Analysis indicates that cost and skills-related factors are the most sensitive parameters for the
data tested. The model and the formulations are a relatively comprehensive package and may help guid outsourcing
decisionmakers and policymakers in public organizations.


